| 1 |
Upamtite da izvršavati pravdu znači svakome dati prema zaslugama. Na primjer, kad radnik radi od jutra do večeri, pravda zahtijeva da mu se plati nadnica; ali kad ne napravi ništa i ne potrudi se, a dobije dar: to je milost. Ako siromašnom čovjeku date milostinju i darove, premda se on nije namučio zbog vas niti je učinio išta kako bi to zaslužio – to je milost. Tako je Krist molio oproštaj za svoje ubojice: to je milost. |
Know that to do justice is to give to everyone according to his deserts. For example, when a workman labors from morning until evening, justice requires that he shall be paid his wages; but when he has done no work and taken no trouble, he is given a gift: this is bounty. If you give alms and gifts to a poor man although he has taken no trouble for you, nor done anything to deserve it, this is bounty. So Christ besought forgiveness for his murderers: this is called bounty. |
| 2 |
Dakle, pitanje dobra i zla određeno je razumom ili zakonom. Neki vjeruju da je određeno zakonom; takvi su Židovi, koji, vjerujući da su sve zapovijedi Petoknjižja apsolutno obvezujuće, smatraju ih pravnim stvarima, ne stvarima razuma. Tako oni kažu da jedna od zapovijedi Petoknjižja kaže da je nezakonito jesti meso i maslac zajedno jer je to taref, a taref na hebrejskom znači nečist, kao što kosher znači čist. To je, kažu oni, pitanje zakona, a ne razuma. |
Now the question of the good or evil of things is determined by reason or by law. Some believe that it is determined by law; such are the Jews, who, believing all the commandments of the Pentateuch to be absolutely obligatory, regard them as matters of law, not of reason. Thus they say that one of the commandments of the Pentateuch is that it is unlawful to partake of meat and butter together because it is taref, and taref in Hebrew means unclean, as kosher means clean. This, they say, is a question of law and not of reason. |
| 3 |
No, teolozi misle da dobro i zlo stvari ovisi i o razumu i o zakonu. Glavni temelj zabrane ubojstva, pljačke, prijevare, laganja, dvoličnosti i okrutnosti jest razum. Svaki inteligentan čovjek shvaća da su ubojstvo, pljačka, prijevara, laganje, dvoličnost i okrutnost zli i vrijedni prijekora; jer ubodete li čovjeka trnom, on će zajaukati, žaliti se i režati; tako je jasno da će shvatiti da je ubojstvo u skladu s razumom zlo i vrijedno prijekora. Počini li ubojstvo, bit će za to odgovoran, bilo da ga je glasovitost Proroka stigla ili ne; jer razum je onaj koji formulira pokudan karakter djela. Kad čovjek počini to loše djelo, on će zasigurno biti odgovoran. |
But the theologians think that the good and evil of things depend upon both reason and law. The chief foundation of the prohibition of murder, theft, treachery, falsehood, hypocrisy and cruelty, is reason. Every intelligent man comprehends that murder, theft, treachery, falsehood, hypocrisy and cruelty are evil and reprehensible; for if you prick a man with a thorn, he will cry out, complain and groan; so it is evident that he will understand that murder according to reason is evil and reprehensible. If he commits a murder, he will be responsible, whether the renown of the Prophet has reached him or not; for it is reason that formulates the reprehensible character of the action. When a man commits this bad action, he will surely be responsible. |
| 4 |
No u mjestu gdje zapovijedi Proroka nisu poznate i gdje ljudi ne djeluju u skladu s božanskim uputama, poput one Kristove da ljudi trebaju zlo vratiti dobrim, nego djeluju u skladu sa željama prirode – tj. ako muče one koji njih muče – sa stajališta religije oprošteno im je jer im božanska zapovijed nije bila prenesena. Premda oni ne zaslužuju milost i dobrohotnost, ipak Bog s njima postupa milostivo i oprašta im. |
But in a place where the commands of a Prophet are not known, and where the people do not act in conformity with the divine instructions, such as the command of Christ to return good for evil, but act according to the desires of nature—that is, if they torment those who torment them—from the point of view of religion they are excused because the divine command has not been delivered to them. Though they do not deserve mercy and beneficence, nevertheless, God treats them with mercy and forgives them. |
| 5 |
Dakle, u skladu s razumom, osveta je također vrijedna prijekora, jer osvetom osvetnik ne dobiva ništa dobro. Tako, udari li čovjek drugoga, a udareni mu iz osvete uzvrati udarac, kakvu će prednost steći? Hoće li to biti melem za njegovu ranu ili lijek za njegovu bol? Ne, sačuvaj Bože! Uistinu, oba su čina jednaka: i jedan i drugi izazvali su ozljede; jedina je razlika u tome što je do jedne došlo prije, a do druge kasnije. Stoga, ako onaj koji je udaren oprosti, štoviše, ako reagira suprotno načinu na koji se prema njemu postupilo – to je hvalevrijedno. Zakon zajednice kaznit će agresora, ali se neće osvetiti. Svrha te kazne jest opomenuti, zaštititi i suprotstaviti se grubosti i ugnjetavanju da ostali ljudi ne bi postali tirani. |
Now vengeance, according to reason, is also blameworthy, because through vengeance no good result is gained by the avenger. So if a man strikes another, and he who is struck takes revenge by returning the blow, what advantage will he gain? Will this be a balm for his wound or a remedy for his pain? No, God forbid! In truth the two actions are the same: both are injuries; the only difference is that one occurred first, and the other afterward. Therefore, if he who is struck forgives, nay, if he acts in a manner contrary to that which has been used toward him, this is laudable. The law of the community will punish the aggressor but will not take revenge. This punishment has for its end to warn, to protect and to oppose cruelty and transgression so that other men may not be tyrannical. |
| 6 |
Ali ako onaj koji je udaren oprosti, on iskazuje najveću milost. To je vrijedno divljenja. |
But if he who has been struck pardons and forgives, he shows the greatest mercy. This is worthy of admiration. |
